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INTRODUCTION
“I am Chelsea Manning.”1 With those words, Army Private Bradley
Manning announced to the world that she would be transitioning from male
to female. Going forward, Manning indicated that she would like to be known
as “Chelsea” and referred to by female pronouns.2 Manning’s public
statement on August 22, 2013, came one day after she was sentenced to
thirty-five years in prison for leaking classified government documents to
WikiLeaks.3 Manning has been in the media spotlight since her arrest in May
2010, and her recent transition has called national attention to some of the
problems facing transgender prisoners in America.4
1

Lenny Bernstein & Julie Tate, Manning to Live as Woman in Prison, WASH. POST, Aug.
23, 2013, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
2
Id. at A6.
3
Charlie Savage & Emmarie Huetteman, Manning Sentenced to 35 Years for a Pivotal
Leak of U.S. Files, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2013, at A1.
4
Transgender prisoner health care has received increased attention in the media. For
example, it was featured on an episode of the popular Netflix series Orange is the New Black
in July 2013. Orange Is the New Black: Lesbian Request Denied, NETFLIX (July 11, 2013),
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There is limited data on the number of transgender5 people in the
nation’s various prisons and jails,6 but transgender people are incarcerated at
a disproportionately high rate.7 Transgender individuals face harsh and
http://www.netflix.com (Netflix web series). In the show, transgender actress Laverne Cox
portrays a male-to-female prisoner housed in a female prison, whose hormone therapy was cut
off due to budget cuts. Id.
5
In this Comment, “sex” refers to “the anatomical and physiological distinctions between
men and women.” Stevie V. Tran & Elizabeth M. Glazer, Transgenderless, 35 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 399, 399 n.1 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[G]ender-nonconforming”
refers to the “failure of an individual to behave in conformity with the cultural expectations
associated with that individual’s sex (or the sex that others assume applies to that individual).”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The term “transgender” is used to describe the “broad
range of people whose gender identity or expression does not conform to the social
expectations for their assigned sex at birth.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Transgender” is used as an “umbrella term” to describe “many different ways of being.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus, someone who is gender-nonconforming could be
considered transgender, but someone who is transgender may not necessarily be considered
gender-nonconforming.” Id. For a discussion of the use of qualifying footnotes on terminology
related to sex and gender—such as this one—in legal scholarship, in “which the author
circumscribes the individuals whose protection the article addresses,” see Elizabeth M. Glazer,
Sexual Reorientation, 100 GEO. L.J. 997, 1062 (2012).
6
A 2009 study by researchers at the University of California, Irvine, identified 332
transgender inmates out of about 155,000 inmates housed in California men’s prisons, which
is roughly 0.2%. LORI SEXTON ET AL., WHERE THE MARGINS MEET: A DEMOGRAPHIC
ASSESSMENT OF TRANSGENDER INMATES IN MEN’S PRISONS 8–9 & 34 n.7 (June 10, 2009),
available at http://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edu/files/2013/06/A-Demographic-Assessmentof-Transgender-Inmates-in-Mens-Prisons.pdf (citing the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation monthly population report from April 30, 2008, which
identified 155,416 incarcerated men. DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB.,
MONTHLY REPORT OF POPULATION AS OF MIDNIGHT APRIL 30, 2008, at 1 (2008), available at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Monthly
/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad0804.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M4GP-9GP3), archived at http://
perma.cc/T94Y-MZTL). However, the study acknowledges that “there were possibly
transgender inmates who were not” included in the study. Id. at 9.
7
See Franklin H. Romeo, Beyond a Medical Model: Advocating for a New Conception of
Gender Identity in the Law, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 713, 71315 (2005). According to
the National Transgender Discrimination Survey, a self-reported survey of transgender
individuals across the country conducted by the National Center for Transgender Equality and
the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, the incarceration rate for transgender individuals is
16%. JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. & NAT’L GAY AND
LESBIAN TASK FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER
DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 163 (2011), available at http://www.thetaskforce.
org/downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M64N-SAEP. The
rate was even higher for transgender respondents of color: 47% for African American
respondents and 30% for American Indian respondents. Id. Moreover, male-to-female
respondents reported a higher incarceration rate (21%) than female-to-male respondents
(10%). Id. By comparison, the Department of Justice reports that among the general American
population in 2001, 4.9% of males and 0.5% of females had been incarcerated at some point
in their lives. THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
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pervasive discrimination in almost all aspects of social lifeeducation,
employment, housing, public accommodations, health care, and law
enforcement.8 As a result of this harassment, many transgender people live
in poverty.9 The combination of high poverty rates and employment
discrimination has led to a greater proportion of transgender people
participating in criminalized economies compared to the general population,
and thus, a disproportionate representation of transgender people in the
criminal justice system and in prisons.10
One of the biggest obstacles transgender people face in prison is
obtaining access to gender-confirming health care, which may include
hormone therapy or sex-reassignment surgery.11 Not all transgender prisoners
request or require such medical treatment, but for some prisoners, denial of
hormone therapy or sex-reassignment surgery can lead to serious mental
health problems, such as depression or anxiety, and even attempts at suicide
and self-castration.12 Writer and activist Janet Mock explains on her website
that for some people “[t]hese surgeries and care are vitally necessary
(whether you exist in or outside of prison walls), and it is a discussion
between a patient and their doctor, not between anyone else.”13

SPECIAL REPORT: PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 19742001 1
(2003), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/P2U2-4ZQC. However, the Department of Justice survey includes only
prisons, not jails, so the actual incarceration rate of the overall population is somewhat higher.
See GRANT ET AL., supra, at163.
8
GRANT ET AL., supra note 7, at 36; Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled
Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve Judicial and Legislative Equality for Transgender
People, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37, 3738 (2000); Romeo, supra note 7, at 71314.
9
See GRANT ET AL., supra note 7, at 2; Romeo, supra note 7, at 71314.
10
See supra note 7.
11
“[G]ender-confirming healthcare is an individualized treatment that differs according to
the needs and pre-existing conditions of individual transgender people.” Dean Spade,
Medicaid Policy & Gender-Confirming Healthcare for Trans People: An Interview with
Advocates, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 497, 497 (2010). Depending on the individual, genderconfirming health care may include hormone therapy treatment or any of a number of surgical
procedures. Id. at 498. Some transgender people may undergo no medical treatment at all in
relation to their expression of gender identity. Id. at 497–98.
12
See Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 755 (2008) (“Depression,
anxiety, and suicidality are conditions commonly tied to the unmet need for gender-confirming
medical care.”); see also Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 197 (D. Mass. 2012)
(discussing transgender plaintiff’s attempts at self-castration and suicide while incarcerated);
Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 244–45 (D. Mass. 2012) (discussing transgender
plaintiff’s history of suicidality and one attempt at self-castration while in custody).
13
Janet Mock, Chelsea Manning & the Battle for Trans Inclusive Healthcare Without
Bias, JANET MOCK (Aug. 22, 2013), http://janetmock.com/2013/08/22/chelsea-manningtransgender-healthcare/, archived at http://perma.cc/4DLK-39M8.
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In many states, laws and prison policies pose serious barriers for
prisoners seeking hormone therapy or sex-reassignment surgery.14 First, a
prison doctor must diagnose the prisoner with a medical condition under the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. In addition to
providing a medical diagnosis, the doctor must also deem hormone therapy
or sex-reassignment surgery a necessary treatment for that condition and
assert that there are no adequate alternatives.15
Under the Fourth Edition of the Manual, this condition was called
“gender identity disorder” (GID).16 In 2013, the editors published the Fifth
Edition of the Manual in which they relabeled GID as “gender dysphoria”
and removed the condition from the chapter on sexual dysfunctions, placing
it in its own chapter.17 Unlike the criteria for GID, which emphasized gender
cross-identification, gender dysphoria emphasizes gender incongruence.18
Gender dysphoria is defined, in part, as a “marked incongruence” between a
person’s experienced or expressed gender and that person’s assigned gender
at birth.19 Because most of the cases and literature discussed in this Comment
refer to GID, this Comment will use the phrase GID when discussing the
medical diagnosis, except where the newer definition is relevant.
As part of Manning’s announcement that she would be transitioning
from male to female, Manning publicly stated her intention to seek hormone
therapy while imprisoned.20 Her request created a new dilemma for the
United States Department of Defense, which is caught between providing her
with adequate medical care for a diagnosed disorder and adhering to the
military’s longstanding policy banning transgender people from serving in
the military.21 When Manning filed her request for hormone therapy and
14

Tracy Clark-Flory, America’s Prisons Fail Transgender Inmates, SALON (Aug. 23,
2013, 11:11 AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/08/23/americas_prisons_fail_transgender_
inmates/, archived at http://perma.cc/QM9G-EU3U.
15
To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim, the plaintiff must show that the desired
course of treatment is medically necessary, which requires showing that no adequate
alternatives exist. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d. 63, 86 (1st Cir. 2014).
16
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 493 (4th ed. rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
17
Mark Moran, New Gender Dysphoria Criteria Replace GID, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (Apr.
5, 2013), http://psychnews.psychiatryonline.org/doi/full/10.1176%2Fappi.pn.2013.4a19,
archived at http://perma.cc/M525-PB44.
18
Id.
19
See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 451–59 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5].
20
Bernstein & Tate, supra note 1, at A1.
21
See Helene Cooper, Pentagon Weighs Transfer of Chelsea Manning to Civilian Facility,
N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/us/pentagon-weighstransfer-of-chelsea-manning-to-civilian-facility.html, archived at http://perma.cc/2S7W-

5. HALBACH (FINAL TO PRINTER) 7/20/2016

468

HALBACH

[Vol. 105

permission to live as a woman, the Army attempted to transfer her to a
civilian prison that could better provide the requested treatment.22 In July
2014, the Federal Bureau of Prisons rejected the Army’s transfer request.23
Subsequently, the Department of Defense approved the Army’s
recommendation that Manning begin “a rudimentary level of gender
treatment,” which could include allowing Manning to dress in female
clothing and receive hormone treatments.24 In February 2015, the
commandant of the Fort Leavenworth military prison where Manning is held
approved adding hormone treatments to Manning’s treatment plan.25
The Department of Defense is not the first agency to confront the issue
of how to provide adequate care for transgender prisoners; many state
departments of corrections have had to address this question, as well. In fact,
several federal courts have recently ruled in favor of transgender inmates
seeking access to gender-confirming health care from state departments of
corrections, holding that prison officials’ denial of such treatment for those
who need it violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishments.26 Although these decisions provide medical relief for the
individual plaintiffs who suffer from severe gender dysphoria, they do not
address the underlying discriminatory nature of such policies. In Manning’s
case, for example, the military’s ban on hormone therapy stems from its

3MFG (“In the American military, transgender service members can be summarily dismissed,
as Defense Department guidelines describe transgender people as sexual deviants and their
condition as ‘paraphilia,’ with its connotations of the atypical and extreme.”).
22
Id.
23
Associated Press, Manning’s Gender Treatments to Be Begun by the Military, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 2014, at A15.
24
Associated Press, Chelsea Manning to Begin Gender Treatment in Military Custody,
N.Y. POST (July 17, 2014, 5:08 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/07/17/chelsea-manning-tobegin-gender-treatment-in-military-custody/, archived at http://perma.cc/5L42-8JZF.
Bernstein & Tate, supra note 1, at A6.
25
Tom Vanden Brook, Army Will Pay for Manning to Become a Woman, USA TODAY,
Feb. 13, 2015, at A1 (quoting a February 5 memorandum from Colonel Erica Nelson,
commandant of the Fort Leavenworth Disciplinary Barracks in Kansas, as stating “After
carefully considering the recommendation that (hormone therapy) is medically appropriate
and necessary, and weighing all associated safety and security risks presented, I approve
adding (hormone treatment) to Inmate Manning’s treatment plan.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
26
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see, e.g., Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 559 (7th Cir. 2011);
Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 455 (1st Cir. 2011); De’lonta v. Clarke, No. 7:11-cv-00257,
2013 WL 4584684, at *1 (W.D. Va. Aug. 28, 2013); Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190,
198 (D. Mass. 2012); Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 252 (D. Mass. 2012); Brugliera
v. Comm’r of Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 07-40323-JLT, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131002 at *1
(D. Mass. Dec. 16, 2009).
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broader discriminatory policy forbidding transgender prisoners from serving
in the military.27
Typically, claims of discrimination against a class of people are litigated
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However,
federal courts have been generally unwilling to rule in favor of transgender
prisoners seeking gender-confirming health care under the Equal Protection
Clause. This Comment argues that transgender prisoners may be able to
develop a doctrine within the Eighth Amendment to litigate their
discrimination claims in the context of prison health care. This Comment
looks closely at the reasoning in two recent transgender prisoner health care
opinions: Fields v. Smith28 and Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II).29 The courts’
Eighth Amendment analyses in these cases were seemingly influenced by
concerns about equal protection and discrimination against transgender
prisoners. This Comment suggests that transgender prisoners should use the
analyses in these opinions as examples of how to frame future Eighth
Amendment claims around facts that show discrimination.
Part I briefly explains the traditional strategy for litigating
discrimination claims—the Equal Protection Clause—and discusses why it
is not likely to be a successful strategy for transgender prisoners seeking
gender-confirming health care. Part II describes the most common litigation
strategy used in transgender prisoner health care cases—the Eighth
Amendment—and discusses some of the criticisms of this doctrine. Part III
analyzes the opinions in Fields and Kosilek II to show how the courts’
decisions under the Eighth Amendment were influenced by equal protection
principles. Part IV argues that transgender plaintiffs have an opportunity to
develop a new discrimination doctrine within the Eighth Amendment.
I. THE TRADITIONAL STRATEGY FOR LITIGATING DISCRIMINATION: EQUAL
PROTECTION
Claims of discrimination are typically litigated under the Equal
Protection Clause. Although this may be a losing strategy for transgender
prisoners seeking access to gender-confirming health care, the underlying
principles of equal protection analysis may be useful.

27

See Cooper, supra note 21; Lisa Leff, Transgender Military Troop Ban Faces Scrutiny,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 13, 2014, 10:23 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/03/13/transgender-troop-ban_n_4956528.html, archived at http://perma.cc/REL2-BR
UF.
28
653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011).
29
889 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Mass. 2012).
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A. THE EQUAL PROTECTION FRAMEWORK

The Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”30 The
essential thrust of this clause is “that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike.”31 The Equal Protection Clause applies to all state and federal
government actions,32 including the informal policies of state departments of
corrections.33 The Supreme Court has developed different tiers of judicial
scrutiny for discriminatory laws or governmental acts that single out a class
of people for differential treatment based on the nature of that classification.
The Court applies the highest level of scrutiny to those laws that burden a
fundamental right or target a suspect class.34
If the law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class,
then the Court applies the more deferential “rational basis” standard of
review.35 Most laws withstand rational basis review because a court will
uphold the law so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental
30

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
32
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498500 (1954) (extending the requirements of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal government through
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) (holding that only affirmative state acts can constitute
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Clause, not the state’s
failure to act).
33
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 502, 515 (2005) (holding that equal protection
challenges to the California Department of Corrections’ unwritten policy of racially
segregating prisoners should be reviewed with strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause).
34
Laws that burden a fundamental right or target a “suspect class,” such as classifications
based on race, receive “strict scrutiny.” See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505 (“[A]ll racial
classifications [imposed by government] . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
strict scrutiny.” (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Such laws must be narrowly tailored to a compelling
governmental interest in order to pass strict scrutiny. Id. (“Under strict scrutiny, the
government has the burden of proving that racial classifications ‘are narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests.’”) Id. (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at
227). Classifications based on gender receive a lower level of scrutiny, called “intermediate
scrutiny.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that
the majority applies “an elevated or ‘intermediate’ level scrutiny”). In order to meet the
intermediate scrutiny standard, such laws must be substantially related to an important
governmental interest. Id. at 197 (“[C]lassifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.”).
35
See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
31
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interest.36 Under rational basis review, courts will generally not consider
whether the actual purpose of the law is the same as the stated governmental
interest.37 However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that “if the
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it
must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”38 The
Court further held in Romer v. Evans that animus alone does not justify
singling out a group of people for discriminatory treatment.39 Courts apply
“a more searching form of rational basis review” to such laws that exhibit a
desire to harm a politically unpopular group.40 Some scholars refer to this
more rigorous standard of rational basis review as “rational basis with bite.”41
B. EQUAL PROTECTION IS A LOSING STRATEGY FOR TRANSGENDER
PRISONERS

Courts have consistently applied the rational basis standard of review to
equal protection claims brought by transgender prisoners.42 At this time, there
36
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental
right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears
a rational relation to some legitimate end.”); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579
(2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Laws such as economic or tax legislation that are
scrutinized under rational basis review normally pass constitutional muster . . . .”).
37
See Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315 (“[B]ecause we never require a legislature to
articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes
whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the
legislature.”); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992) (stating that equal protection “does
not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker
actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification”);
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 n.7 (1981) (“In equal protection
analysis, this Court will assume that the objectives articulated by the legislature are actual
purposes of the statute, unless an examination of the circumstances forces us to conclude that
they ‘could not have been a goal of the legislation.’” (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975))).
38
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (emphasis omitted); see City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (holding that “irrational
prejudice” against the mentally disabled is not a legitimate governmental purpose).
39
Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (The Colorado state constitutional amendment permitting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation “seems inexplicable by anything but animus
toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”).
40
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
41
See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and Rationality, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 923,
928 (2010) (citing ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
680 (3d ed. 2006)).
42
See, e.g., Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 867–68 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (applying
rational basis review to plaintiff’s challenge of a state law preventing treatment of gender
identity disorder to inmates because there was no suspect classification at issue); Battista v.
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is no indication that courts are willing to extend heightened scrutiny to
classifications based on gender identity, either by recognizing transgender
people as a suspect class or by squeezing transgender people into
classifications based on sex.
Transgender people do not constitute a suspect class, and it is not likely
the Supreme Court will recognize them as such anytime soon.43 The Court
currently recognizes five suspect classifications that receive heightened
scrutiny: race,44 national origin,45 alienage,46 sex,47 and nonmarital
parentage.48 The Court has not added any new classifications to the list since
adding nonmarital parentage in 1977. Moreover, the Court has refused to
apply heightened scrutiny to other classifications, including age,49
Dennehy, No. 05-11456-DPW, 2006 U.S. Dist. WL 1581528, at *6 (D. Mass. Mar. 22, 2006)
(“The underlying equal protection inquiry, . . . is whether different treatment of two separately
classified groups is at least marginally reasonable.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
43
For further discussion, see Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 747 (2011). Yoshino argues that “pluralism anxiety” has caused the Supreme Court to
systematically deny heightened scrutiny to new groups. Id. at 755. Pluralism anxiety is an
apprehension about the country’s growing diversity that stems from the increased visibility of
“‘new’ kinds of people,” including immigrants, and “newly visible people,” including groups
introduced to the country by social movements, such as the transgender community. Id. at 747.
Yoshino argues that the Supreme Court has all but closed the possibility of creating a new
suspect class. Id. at 757.
44
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (subjecting a state law prohibiting
marriage between a white person and a person of another race to strict scrutiny).
45
See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 64546 (1948) (subjecting a state land transfer
statute that discriminated on the basis of national origin to strict scrutiny); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 21516 (1944) (applying the “most rigid scrutiny” to legislation and an
executive order that excluded individuals of Japanese ancestry from the U.S. West Coast
during World War II).
46
See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (subjecting a state law that
conditioned welfare benefits on citizenship to heightened scrutiny). But see Foley v. Connelie,
435 U.S. 291, 297, 299300 (1978) (applying rational basis review to a New York state law
requirement that police be citizens because the law pertained to a core governmental function);
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 8183, 87 (1976) (holding that congressional use of the
alienage classification requires only rational basis review because the Constitution grants
Congress authority over alienage issues).
47
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 53031 (1996) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to gender-based discrimination in education); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204
(1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to gender-based discrimination in a state statute
regulating the sale of alcohol).
48
See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 76567, 769 (1977) (applying heightened
scrutiny to a state statute permitting children born in wedlock, but not children born out of
wedlock, to inherit from their intestate fathers).
49
See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 31314 (1976) (per curiam) (subjecting
the state mandatory retirement age of fifty for police officers to rational basis review because
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disability,50 and sexual orientation.51 With the Court reluctant to expand
heightened scrutiny to new classifications, arguing for a suspect class based
on gender nonconformity seems untenable.
Historically, courts have been unwilling to include discrimination
against transgender people in the definition of discrimination “based on sex”
or sex stereotyping,52 although this may be changing in the context of
employment discrimination. Both the Sixth and the Eleventh Circuits have
held that discrimination against transgender employees may constitute
discrimination “because of sex” and sex stereotyping under Title VII and the
Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, those circuits have applied an
intermediate level of scrutiny to the claims of transgender employees.53
it implicated neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class).
50
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985) (applying
rational basis review to a city zoning ordinance that prevented homes for the mentally disabled
to be built in certain areas).
51
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2706 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The
[majority opinion invaliding the Defense of Marriage Act] does not resolve and indeed does
not even mention what had been the central question in this litigation: whether, under the Equal
Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman are reviewed for more than
mere rationality.”); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (avoiding the question of
whether a classification based on sexual orientation merits heightened scrutiny by finding that
a Colorado constitutional amendment repealing ordinances prohibiting discrimination based
on sexual orientation violated equal protection “in the most literal sense”); but see SmithKline
Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 2014) (interpreting Windsor as
applying heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation).
52
See Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J.
15, 32 & n.48 (2003) (citing Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir.
1984 (“The words of Title VII do not outlaw discrimination against a person who has a sexual
identity disorder, i.e., . . . a person born with a female body who believes herself to be a
male . . . .”)); see also Sommers v. Budget Mktg., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding
that “discrimination based on one’s transsexualism does not fall within the protective purview
of” Title VII’s protections against discrimination based on sex); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson
& Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977) (refusing to extend protection of Title VII to transgender
employees because discrimination against transgender individuals is on the basis of “gender”
rather than “sex”), overruled by Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000)
(recognizing that the approach in Holloway was overruled by the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
53
Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court’s
holding that discrimination against a transgender employee constituted discrimination based
on sex in violation of the Equal Protection Clause where the government failed to supply a
“sufficiently important governmental interest”); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729,
737 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that transgender plaintiff stated a claim for sex discrimination
“by alleging discrimination . . . for his failure to conform to sex stereotypes”); Smith v. City
of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Having alleged that his failure to conform to
sex stereotypes concerning how a man should look and behave was the driving force behind
Defendants’ actions, Smith has sufficiently pleaded claims of sex stereotyping and gender
discrimination.”); see also Schroer v. Billington, 557 F. Supp. 2d 293, 308 (D.D.C. 2008) (“In
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However, courts have shown no sign of extending intermediate scrutiny
to discrimination against transgender people in the prison context. Courts
have been consistent in applying rational basis review to the equal protection
claims of transgender prisoners seeking gender-confirming health care, and
few have found in favor of the prisoner on equal protection grounds.54
Whether or not equal protection will prove a viable litigation strategy in the
future, it is not likely to be a successful strategy at this time.
II. THE CURRENT STRATEGY: LITIGATING TRANSGENDER PRISONER
MEDICAL NEEDS UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
In light of the unlikelihood of successful litigation under the Equal
Protection Clause, transgender prisoner plaintiffs have turned to the Eighth
Amendment to argue that a deprivation of hormone therapy and sexreassignment surgery constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
A. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK

The Eighth Amendment proscribes “cruel and unusual punishments.”55
Cruel and unusual punishment is that which is “incompatible with the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society,”56 or that which involves “unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain.”57 In the context of prison medical care, “unnecessary and wanton

refusing to hire [plaintiff] because her appearance and background did not comport with the
decisionmaker’s sex stereotypes about how men and women should act and appear, and in
response to [plaintiff’s] decision to transition, legally, culturally, and physically, from male to
female, the Library of Congress violated Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination.”).
54
Some courts have dismissed equal protection claims because they found—with only a
brief discussion—that the plaintiffs failed to show they were treated differently than similarly
situated individuals. See, e.g., Jackson v. Sampson, 536 F. App’x 356, 358 (4th Cir. 2013);
Smith v. Hayman, 489 F. App’x 544, 547 (3d Cir. 2012); Battista v. Dennehy, No. 05-11456DPW, 2006 U.S. Dist. WL 1581528, at *6–7 (D. Mass. Mar. 22, 2006). At least one court
avoided addressing the equal protection issue by deciding the case on Eighth Amendment
grounds. See, e.g., Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 559 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Having determined
that the district court properly held that Act 105 violates the Eighth Amendment, both on its
face and as applied to plaintiffs, we need not address the district court’s alternate holding that
the law violates the Equal Protection Clause.”). Others did not address the Equal Protection
Clause at all because it was not raised in the pleadings. See, e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F.
Supp. 2d 190, 197 (D. Mass. 2012) (“Kosilek alleges that his rights under the Eighth
Amendment are being violated by the DOC’s refusal to provide him with . . . sex reassignment
surgery . . . .”).
55
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
56
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
57
Id. at 103 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
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infliction of pain” is denial of medical care where such denial would serve
no penological purpose.58 While imprisoned, “[a]n inmate must rely on
prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so,
those needs will not be met.”59 An Eighth Amendment violation occurs where
prison officials have shown “deliberate indifference to [the] serious medical
needs of prisoners.”60 This test has both an objective and subjective prong. 61
Whether a prisoner’s particular medical needs constitute a “serious medical
need” is an objective inquiry;62 whether the prison officials acted with
“deliberate indifference” is a subjective inquiry.63
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance on what constitutes a
serious medical need.64 The First Circuit defines a serious medical need as
one “that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or one
that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity
for a doctor’s attention.”65 The Ninth Circuit defines a serious medical need
as “one that involves a substantial risk of serious harm if not adequately
treated.”66
The Supreme Court has never addressed the question of whether GID or
gender dysphoria constitutes a serious medical need protected by the Eighth
Amendment, and most circuit courts have avoided expressly ruling on the
issue. Some circuit courts have found that GID can constitute a serious
medical need in certain situations.67 Other courts have avoided the question
58

Id.
Id.
60
Id. at 104.
61
Koselik v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 206 (D. Mass. 2012).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
See Brittany Glidden, Necessary Suffering?: Weighing Government and Prisoner
Interests in Determining What is Cruel and Unusual, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1815, 1817 (2012)
(“The ‘objective’ prong purports to measure the ‘seriousness’ of the challenged condition, but
close scrutiny of court decisions reveals that there is no organized methodology to determine
what makes a condition ‘sufficiently’ serious.”).
65
Mahan v. Plymouth Cnty. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting
Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
66
Kosilek, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 207 (citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th
Cir. 1992)) (“A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could
result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
67
In 1988, the Eighth Circuit found that “transsexualism” is a serious medical need for
which some type of treatment is required, although not necessarily hormone therapy. White v.
Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 1988). Seven years later, in Long v. Nix, the Southern
District of Iowa interpreted the definition of “transsexualism” narrowly, to exclude GID. 877
F. Supp. 1358, 1365 (S.D. Iowa 1995). In 1986, the Tenth Circuit held that some form of
59
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by assuming, without holding, that GID is a serious medical need under the
Eighth Amendment.68
As for the subjective prong, a prison official is deliberately indifferent
if he disregards a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate’s health or
safety.69 However, the official is only deliberately indifferent if he both knew
of facts from which he could infer that risk, and he did in fact draw the
inference.70
Even if prison officials know that their decisions pose risks to inmates,
they may not be adjudged deliberately indifferent if they determine that
safety concerns outweigh the harm to any individual prisoner. The “realities
of prison administration,”71 including the need for prison officials to “take
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates,”72 are relevant to
whether officials acted with deliberate indifference, and the court must
usually give deference to the prison officials’ “judgment concerning what is
necessary to discharge their duty to maintain institutional security.” 73 In
Whitley v. Albers, the Supreme Court held that, in deciding whether to use
force to quell a prison riot, prison officials must weigh the risk of harm to the
inmate against “competing institutional concerns for the safety of prison staff

therapy was needed after the plaintiff mutilated her genitals so severely that they had to be
removed by a doctor. Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 963 (10th Cir. 1986). Nine years later,
the Tenth Circuit interpreted its holding in Supre more broadly to stand for the rule that “prison
officials must provide treatment to address the medical needs of transsexual prisoners.” Brown
v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1995). As in Supre, the Fourth Circuit in De’Lonta v.
Angelone found that the plaintiff’s “uncontrollable urge to mutilate her genitals” was a serious
medical need, without addressing whether GID itself was a serious medical need. 330 F.3d
630, 632, 634 (4th Cir. 2003). In Praylor v. Texas, the Fifth Circuit initially held that the
plaintiff was not constitutionally entitled to hormone therapy, even though transsexualism
does constitute a serious medical need. 423 F.3d 524, 525 (5th Cir. 2005). The court later
withdrew its opinion and issued a new holding in which it refused to decide whether
transsexualism constitutes a serious medical need. Praylor v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice,
430 F.3d 1208, 1209 (5th Cir. 2005); see Young v. Adams, 693 F. Supp. 2d 635, 640 (W.D.
Tex. 2010) (explaining the procedural history in Praylor). For further discussion of whether
GID should be considered a serious medical need, see Laura R. Givens, Note, Why the Courts
Should Consider Gender Identity Disorder a Per Se Serious Medical Need for Eighth
Amendment Purposes, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 579, 58793 (2013).
68
Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 555 (7th Cir. 2011) (on appeal, the appellant, Wisconsin
Department of Justice, did not challenge the district court’s holding that GID constitutes a
serious medical need).
69
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
70
Id.
71
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1993).
72
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
73
Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II), 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 210 (D. Mass. 2012) (citing
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 32122 (1986)); see Fields, 653 F.3d at 55758.
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or other inmates.”74 The Court noted that while such a balancing of prisoner
and institutional concerns is appropriate in the context of a prison riot, it is
not usually necessary when attending to prisoners’ medical needs. The Court
observed that “the state’s responsibility to attend to the medical needs of
prisoners does not ordinarily clash with other equally important
governmental responsibilities.”75
Although most medical needs cases do not raise concerns about prison
security,76 prison officials often rely on institutional security as a justification
for refusing to provide hormone therapy or sex-reassignment surgery for
prisoners diagnosed with GID or gender dysphoria.77 In Fields v. Smith, the
Wisconsin Department of Justice defended a state law that prohibited prisons
from providing hormone therapy to inmates on the grounds that “hormone
therapy alters a person's secondary sex characteristics such as breast size and
body hair” and “that hormones feminize inmates and make them more
susceptible to inciting prison violence.”78
Acknowledging the unique security concern that may be implicated by
allowing a male-to-female prisoner to present herself as a female in a male
prison,79 courts have extended the rule in Whitley to these medical needs
74

Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320. In Whitley, the prisoner brought a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for deprivation of his civil rights after he was shot in the leg by a prison guard during
the quelling of a prison riot. Id. at 316–17. The Court held that during a prison riot, “prison
officials undoubtedly must take into account the very real threats the unrest presents to inmates
and prison officials alike” in deciding whether or not to use force against the inmates. Id. at
320. Noting that the balancing test should be applied with “due regard for differences in the
kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amendment objection is lodged,” the Court
distinguished prison riots from medical treatment. Id.
75
Id. (noting that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need could “typically be
established or disproved without the necessity of balancing competing institutional concerns
for the safety of prison staff or other inmates”).
76
See id.
77
See, e.g., Fields, 653 F.3d at 557 (“Because hormone therapy alters a person’s secondary
sex characteristics such as breast size and body hair, defendants argue that hormones feminize
inmates and make them more susceptible to inciting prison violence.”); Battista v. Clarke, 645
F.3d 449, 451 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Its security evaluation is at the core of the Department’s
substantive objection to hormone therapy for Battista.”); Koselik II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 19798
(holding that the prison officials’ stated concern that providing sex-reassignment surgery
“would create insurmountable security problems” was pretextual); Soneeya v. Spencer, 851
F. Supp. 2d 228, 240, 247–48 (D. Mass. 2012) (invalidating the Department of Corrections’
formal policy which states that “[g]enital sex reassignment surgery is prohibited as it presents
overwhelming safety and security concerns in a correctional environment”).
78
Fields, 653 F.3d at 557.
79
A 2007 study of California men’s prisons found that 59% of transgender women had
been sexually assaulted while in prison, as compared to 4% of a random sample of the general
prison population. VALERIE JENNESS ET AL., VIOLENCE IN CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 3 (2007), available at http://
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cases. They cite to Whitley for the proposition that a denial of hormone
therapy or sex-reassignment surgery may not be overly harsh “in light of the
realities of prison administration”80 and that “[p]rison administrators are
usually entitled to deference by the courts in their judgment concerning what
is necessary to discharge their duty to maintain institutional security.” 81
However, “deference does not extend to actions taken in bad faith and for no
legitimate purpose.”82 Thus, courts analyze the government’s stated security
concern to determine whether it is pretextual.83
Although prison security may be a permissible reason for denying
adequate care for a serious medical need, many federal courts have found that
the cost of the treatment is never a legitimate reason for denying adequate
medical care.84 In the context of GID, courts have rejected cost as a legitimate
www.wcl.american.edu/endsilence/documents/ViolenceinCaliforniaCorrectionalFacilities.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/A3R4-UD5K. See generally Gabriel Arkles, Safety and
Solidarity Across Gender Lines: Rethinking Segregation of Transgender People in Detention,
18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 515, 517 (2009) (discussing the causes and nature of
violence against transgender, intersex, and gender nonconforming people in prisons).
80
Soneeya, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 243 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319).
81
Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 210 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 32122); see Fields, 653
F.3d at 55758.
82
Fields, 653 F.3d at 558 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322 (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
83
Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 452 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[D]efendants’ reliance on their
administrative discretion in invoking and dealing with security concerns has been undercut by
a collection of pretexts, delays, and misrepresentations . . . .”); Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at
210 (“[P]rison officials forfeit their right to deference when their stated, legitimate grounds
for refusing treatment are proven to be pretextual, and the plaintiff establishes that the
‘balancing judgments’ were not ‘within the realm of reason and made in good faith.’” (quoting
Battista, 645 F.3d at 45455)).
84
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 30102 (1991) (finding no “indication that other [prison]
officials have sought to use [a cost defense] to avoid the holding of Estelle v. Gamble”); Fields,
653 F.3d at 556 (“[A]t oral argument . . . [the state] disclaimed any argument that [the statute
prohibiting hormone therapy or sex reassignment surgery] is justified by cost savings.”);
Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 704 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that plaintiff’s claim that
doctors “recommended extraction [of tooth] not on the basis of their medical views, but
because of monetary incentives,” if proven, would contribute to a showing of deliberate
indifference by the defendants); Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding
that the fact that evidence that prison doctor avoided providing physical therapy to an inmate
because it “would have placed a considerable burden and expense on the prison and was
therefore frowned upon throughout the prison health system” might contribute to a showing
of deliberate indifference); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1509 (11th Cir. 1991) (“We do
not agree that ‘financial considerations must be considered in determining the reasonableness’
of inmates’ medical care to the extent that such a rationale could ever be used by so-called
‘poor states’ to deny a prisoner the minimally adequate care to which he or she is entitled.”
(quoting district court opinion)); Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986) (“We
find no other explanation in the record than the budget concerns for denying Jones’s surgery.
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justification for denying hormone therapy or sex-reassignment surgery.85
B. CRITICISMS OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT MEDICAL MODEL

The problem with litigating under the Eighth Amendment rather than
the Equal Protection Clause is that the Eighth Amendment relies more
heavily on a medical definition of gender nonconformity. Under the Equal
Protection Clause, the class of people who identify as gender nonconforming
is not necessarily based on a medical definition. Unlike the Eighth
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause has not been interpreted to have a
specific requirement that each individual plaintiff prove that he or she has a
serious medical need for which hormone therapy or sex-reassignment surgery
is a necessary treatment. Some transgender activists have harshly criticized
the medical approach as being at odds with the view in the transgender
community that self-identification, not a medical diagnosis, should be the
determining factor of a person’s membership in a gender category.86 Most of
the published criticisms of the medical model are based on the DSM-IV
definition of GID, rather than the new DSM-5 definition of gender
dysphoria.87 These include four main criticisms.88
First, scholars have argued that “the medical model pathologizes and
thus stigmatizes trans people.”89 A medical diagnosis of GID implies that
Budgetary constraints, however, do not justify cruel and unusual punishment.”); Ancata v.
Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 705 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Lack of funds for facilities
cannot justify an unconstitutional lack of competent medical care and treatment for inmates.”
(internal citation omitted)).
85
See, e.g., Fields, 653 F.3d at 556 (“[A]t oral argument . . . [the state] disclaimed any
argument that [the statute prohibiting hormone therapy or sex-reassignment surgery] is
justified by cost savings.”); Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 210 (“the cost of adequate medical
care is not a legitimate reason for not providing such care to a prisoner”); Soneeya, 851 F.
Supp. 2d at 243 (“Cost of treatment . . . may not be used as a reason to deny an inmate
medically necessary care.”); Koselik v. Maloney (Kosilek I), 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 162 (D.
Mass. 2002) (if “concerns about cost or controversy prompt [the DOC Commissioner] to deny
Kosilek adequate care for his serious medical need, [the DOC Commissioner] will have
violated the Eighth Amendment”).
86
See Judith Butler, Undiagnosing Gender, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 274, 275 (Paisley
Currah et al. eds., 2006); Spade, supra note 52, at 29.
87
See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
88
See Alvin Lee, Trans Models in Prison: The Medicalization of Gender Identity and the
Eighth Amendment Right to Sex Reassignment Therapy, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 447, 457
(2008) (discussing the criticisms of the Eighth Amendment medical model).
89
Id. See also Butler, supra note 86, at 275 (“To be diagnosed with gender identity
disorder is to . . . suffer a certain stigmatization as a consequence of the diagnosis being given
at all.”); Jerry L. Dasti, Note, Advocating a Broader Understanding of the Necessity of SexReassignment Surgery Under Medicaid, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1738, 1738 (2002) (calling for a
“broader conception of medical necessity” that “does not . . . stigmatiz[e] gender variance as
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transgender individuals “are somehow flawed people”90 and that they are “in
some way . . . ill, sick, wrong, out of order [or] abnormal.”91 Second, critics
have argued that the medical model disadvantages low-income transgender
people who cannot afford the level of health care needed to diagnose and treat
GID.92
The third criticism of the medical model based on a diagnosis of GID is
that it is underinclusive.93 Critics have argued that gender nonconforming
people who do not fit neatly into the DSM-IV definition would be foreclosed
from a diagnosis of GID.94 Furthermore, in most jurisdictions, even a
diagnosis of GID alone is insufficient to prove that a prisoner suffers from a
serious medical need under the Eighth Amendment; most courts additionally
require the prisoner to prove that the denial of treatment will result in serious
physical or mental harm. Courts often look for extreme evidence of harm
such as attempted suicide or self-castration,95 overlooking prisoners suffering
from other real, but less extreme, harms. Finally, critics of the medical model
based on GID have argued that it reinforces a coercive gender binary.96 The
diagnostic criteria for GID are based on the idea of “two discrete gender
categories that normally contain everyone but occasionally are wrongly
assigned.”97 This narrow conception of gender excludes some transgender
and genderless individuals who do not fit into one of the stereotypical gender
categories. Thus, relying on a diagnosis of GID leaves behind those
individuals who do not “inhabit and perform the new gender category
successfully.”98
In drafting the DSM-5, the editors responded to these criticisms by
replacing GID with a new category called “gender dysphoria.”99 The editors
sought to create a whole new conception of the condition that would
minimize the stigma of a medical diagnosis without eliminating the condition
a ‘disease’ that must be ‘cured’”).
90
Spade, supra note 52, at 34.
91
Butler, supra note 86, at 275.
92
Lee, supra note 88, at 458; Spade, supra note 52, at 35.
93
Lee, supra note 88, at 45859.
94
Id. at 459; Romeo, supra note 7, at 731 (“Because the experiences of many gender
nonconforming people do not match the diagnostic criteria of GID, and because, for all except
the most privileged few, accessing trans-friendly health care is extraordinarily difficult, the
medical model of gender does not serve the vast majority of gender non-conforming people.”).
95
See De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 632 (4th Cir. 2003); Supre v. Ricketts, 792
F.2d 958, 960, 963 (10th Cir. 1986).
96
Lee, supra note 88, at 459; see Spade, supra note 52, at 35.
97
Spade, supra note 52, at 26.
98
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
99 Moran, supra note 17.
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completely.100 They were concerned with maintaining access to a medical
diagnosis for those people who rely on the diagnosis to obtain medical
care.101 This is especially important for prisoners seeking gender-confirming
medical treatment under the Eighth Amendment, who have to prove that they
have a serious medical need. Instead of eliminating the condition, the editors
removed it from the chapter on sexual dysfunctions, placing it in its own
chapter called gender dysphoria. In addition to removing the word “disorder”
from the title, the editors changed the diagnostic criteria to reflect an
emphasis on gender incongruence rather than cross-gender identification.102
This new conceptualization moves away from the gender binary, making the
condition more inclusive for those people who do not fit neatly into one
gender category.
Although the new diagnostic criteria in the DSM-5 addressed many of
the criticisms of the medical model, it could not change the fact that requiring
a medical diagnosis in the first place disadvantages low income transgender
people who do not have access to health care. This is especially a problem in
the prison context, because some state departments of correction apply a
“freeze frame” policy to hormone therapy, which conditions access to
hormone therapy on whether or not the prisoner was receiving treatment
before entering the prison system.103 Treatment is “frozen” at the level of
hormones the prisoner was receiving at the time he or she entered the prison
system.104 However, prisons may be moving away from this “freeze frame”
model. In 2011, the Federal Bureau of Prisons agreed to end its “freeze
frame” policy for hormone therapy as part of the settlement in a lawsuit
brought by a transgender prisoner in a federal prison in Massachusetts.105
Id.
Id.
102 Id.
103
See, e.g., ALA. DEP’T OF CORR., ADMIN. REGULATION 637(V)(E)(2) (2005), available
at http:// www.doc.state.al.us/docs/AdminRegs/AR637.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9AQ
6-87U4.
104
See Press Release, Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Federal Bureau of Prisons
Makes Major Change in Transgender Medical Policy (Sept. 30, 2011), available at
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/press-releases/2011-09-29-adams-victory.pdf (describing
the federal “freeze frame” policy prior to 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/3XG8-GDWT.
105
Stipulation for Compromise Settlement and Release Ex. A, Adams v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, No. 09-10272-JLT (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2011), available at http://www.clearing
house.net/detail.php?id=14130&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BdocketSimpleYear%7C2009
%3BdocketSimpleText%7C10272%3BtrialCourt%7C38%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B,
archived at http://perma.cc/AEQ4-CURV; see Case Summary & History: Adams v. Federal
Bureau of Prisons et al., NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, http://www.nclrights.org/casesand-policy/cases-and-advocacy/adams-v-federal-bureau-of-prisons-et-al/ (last visited Jan. 23,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/G86G-UZFF; see also Adams v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
100
101
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The medical model of the Eighth Amendment will always be somewhat
in conflict with a conception of gender identity based only on selfidentification. However, where the treatment sought is of a medical nature,
like hormone therapy and sex-reassignment surgery, prisons are realistically
always going to require a medical diagnosis.
III. FINDING DISCRIMINATION WITHIN THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Neither the Eighth Amendment nor the Equal Protection Clause is a
perfect litigation strategy for challenging discriminatory prison policies
banning hormone therapy and sex-reassignment surgery. Although litigants
have had considerably more success obtaining access to gender-confirming
health care under the Eighth Amendment than the Equal Protection Clause,
the Eighth Amendment has not traditionally been used as a tool for fighting
discrimination. However, two recent federal court opinions suggest that
discrimination may in fact be relevant to Eighth Amendment analysis.
In Fields v. Smith, the Seventh Circuit struck down a state law banning
hormone therapy and sex-reassignment surgery for all prisoners in the
state.106 In Kosilek v. Spencer, the District of Massachusetts granted an
injunction requiring prison officials to provide the plaintiff with sexreassignment surgery.107 Both courts relied on the Eighth Amendment,
holding that prison officials had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs’
serious medical needs. Although neither court’s holding relied on the Equal
Protection Clause, their Eighth Amendment analyses were laced with
concerns about discrimination against and the equal protection of transgender
prisoners. Subparts III(A) and III(B) look closely at the courts’ reasoning in
these two opinions for signs of equal protection influence, and subpart III(C)
discusses these two cases in the broader context of transgender prisoner
health care litigation.
A. HIDDEN EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS: FIELDS V. SMITH

In Fields v. Smith, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision to strike down a Wisconsin state law (Act 105) prohibiting the
Wisconsin Department of Corrections (WDOC) from providing transgender
inmates with hormone therapy or sex-reassignment surgery.108 The district
716 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D. Mass. 2010) (order denying the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ motion to
dismiss the complaint).
106
Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 559 (7th Cir. 2011).
107
Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II), 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 204 (D. Mass. 2012), rev’d, 774
F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014). For a discussion of the subsequent history of this case, see infra text
accompanying notes 132–140, 171–175.
108
Fields, 653 F.3d at 559.
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court held that the blanket prohibition on access to certain types of treatment
for GID violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.109 The district court denied class certification “on behalf of all
current and future [W]DOC inmates with ‘strong, persistent cross-gender
identification,’” but allowed three individual plaintiffs to proceed.110 The
plaintiffsAndrea Fields, Matthew Davison (also known as Jessica
Davison), and Vankemah Moatonwere male-to-female transgender
prisoners.111 Before Act 105 was passed, WDOC physicians had diagnosed
each of them with GID and prescribed hormone therapy.112
The district court held that Act 105 violated the Eighth Amendment
facially113 and as applied to these three plaintiffs.114 The court found that GID
is a serious medical need and that by enforcing the blanket ban on hormone
therapy and sex-reassignment surgery, prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to that need.115
The district court also held that Act 105 violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that no fundamental
right or suspect classification was at issue, so the rational basis standard of
review was appropriate.116 To prevail under rational basis review, a plaintiff
must prove: (1) the defendant intentionally treated him differently from
similarly situated individuals; (2) the differential treatment was because of
his membership in a class; and (3) the differential treatment was not rationally
related to a legitimate governmental interest.117
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that
Act 105 violates the Eighth Amendment, “both on its face and as applied to
plaintiffs,” and thus found it unnecessary to “address the district court’s
alternate holding that the law violates the Equal Protection Clause.”118
Although the Seventh Circuit expressly said that it would not address the
109

Id. at 553.
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 866 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (“[T]he controlling class
for a facial challenge to a statute is ‘the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group
for whom the law is irrelevant.’” (internal citation omitted)).
114
Id. at 863. The court held that as applied to the plaintiffs in Fields, enforcement of Act
105 prevents WDOC doctors from providing treatment that they have deemed necessary to
treat the plaintiffs’ serious medical conditions. Id.
115
Id. at 862, 866.
116
Id. at 867.
117
Id. (citing Smith v. City of Chicago, 457 F.3d 643, 65051 (7th Cir. 2006)).
118
Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 559 (7th Cir. 2011).
110
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equal protection claim, it affirmed the district court’s reasoning under each
step of the rational basis test, essentially engaging in a covert equal protection
analysis.
First, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis appeared to adopt the district court’s
analysis under the first step of the rational basis test. The Seventh Circuit
echoed the district court’s equal protection language by making two clear
references to similarly situated individuals. In the first reference, the court
relied on the same medical testimony as the district court in finding that “no
other state law or policy, besides Act 105, . . . prohibits prison doctors from
providing inmates with medically necessary treatment.”119
In the second reference, the Seventh Circuit referred to similarly situated
prisoners in its discussion of the costs of hormone therapy and sexreassignment surgery. The court analyzed the costs of these treatments to
undermine the empirical assumption that such treatments are expensive.120
The defendants conceded in oral argument that cost savings do not justify
Act 105.121 The court relied on the record to show that the costs of hormone
therapy and sex-reassignment surgery are no more than the costs of medical
treatments for other prisoners:
In 2004, DOC paid a total of $2,300 for hormones for two inmates. That same year,
DOC paid $2.5 million to provide inmates with quetiapine, an antipsychotic drug which
costs more than $2,500 per inmate per year. Sex reassignment surgery is significantly
more expensive, costing approximately $20,000. However, other significant surgeries
may be more expensive. In 2005, DOC paid $37,244 for one coronary bypass surgery
and $32,897 for one kidney transplant surgery.122

Second, the Seventh Circuit appeared to affirm the district court’s
finding under the second step of the rational basis test that those in the class
of “persons who need hormonal therapy to treat GID”123 were singled out for
different treatment because of their membership in that class. The Seventh
119
Id. at 554. In finding that Act 105 “intentionally treated [the plaintiffs] differently from
others similarly situated,” Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 867 (internal citation omitted), the district
court reasoned that “GID is the only medically necessary condition for which mental health
treatments are barred by law or regulation within the DOC.” Id. It also noted that “there is no
evidence of any other Wisconsin laws banning medical treatment for inmates or any DOC
policies that ban necessary medical treatment for inmates.” Id.
120
Fourteen years earlier, in Maggert v. Hanks, the Seventh Circuit upheld summary
judgment in favor of the defendants in a similar deliberate indifference case, relying on the
empirical assumption that hormone therapy and sex-reassignment surgery are “protracted and
expensive” and not necessarily available to those who are not affluent. Maggert v. Hanks, 131
F.3d 670, 67172 (7th Cir. 1997). The court in Fields analyzed the costs to undermine this
dicta from Maggert. Fields, 653 F.3d at 555–56.
121
Fields, 653 F.3d at 556.
122
Id. at 555.
123
Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 867.
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Circuit stated that “[s]urely, had the Wisconsin legislature passed a law that
DOC inmates with cancer must be treated only with therapy and pain killers,
this court would have no trouble concluding that the law was
unconstitutional.”124 By replacing the more controversial medical need, GID,
with one that most people accept as a serious medical need, cancer, the court
implied that this group of prisoners was singled out because of the nature of
its members’ medical needs.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s reasoning under
the third step of the rational basis review test, in which the district court held
that Act 105 was not rationally related to prison officials’ stated security
concerns.125 Although the district court analyzed prison security under the
Equal Protection Clause,126 not the Eighth Amendment, the Seventh Circuit
simply adopted the district court’s security findings into its Eighth
Amendment analysis. The Seventh Circuit held that “[t]he district court did
not abuse its discretion in concluding that defendants’ evidence failed to
establish any security benefits associated with a ban on hormone therapy.”127
Although the Seventh Circuit explicitly said it would not evaluate
Act 105 under the Equal Protection Clause, it did just that. The court affirmed
the reasoning of the district court on each of the three steps of the rational
basis review test.
B. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND POLITICAL CONTROVERSY:
KOSILEK V. SPENCER

In Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II), the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts granted an injunction in favor of the plaintiff
Michelle Kosilek, a male-to-female transgender prisoner, requiring the
Massachusetts Department of Corrections (MDOC) to provide her with sexreassignment surgery.128 The court’s order was the first in United States
124

Fields, 653 F.3d at 556.
Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 868.
126
The district court found that “[p]rison safety and security are legitimate penological
interests,” but that Act 105 is not rationally related to “the DOC’s interests in protecting
effeminate-appearing inmates from harm and maintaining the safety and security of other
inmates, staff, and the institution.” Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 867–68. The district court
focused on testimony from the state’s security expert, who conceded that it would be an
“incredible stretch” to say that prohibiting hormone therapy would prevent sexual assaults in
prison. Id. at 868. The district court found no evidence that banning hormone therapy would
decrease the risk that plaintiffs would become targets of sexual assault, and thus, the Act is
not rationally related to the government’s stated interest in maintaining prison security. Id.
127
Fields, 653 F.3d at 558.
128
Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II), 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 197, 251 (D. Mass. 2012), rev’d,
774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014).
125
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history to require a department of corrections to provide sex-reassignment
surgery for a prisoner.129 The district court held that the MDOC
Commissioner’s decision to deny Kosilek the surgery violated her Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.130
Specifically, the district court found that Kosilek had a serious medical need,
GID, for which sex-reassignment surgery was the only adequate treatment,
and that the MDOC Commissioner was deliberately indifferent to that need
in refusing to provide the surgery.131
In January 2014, a three-judge panel of the First Circuit affirmed the
district court’s order.132 The panel held that the district court did not clearly
err in finding that the MDOC’s failure to provide surgery to Kosilek
constituted inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment.133 The
panel also held that the district court did not err in finding that the MDOC
had no valid penological reason for denying the surgery.134 However, one
month later, the First Circuit withdrew this opinion and granted a rehearing
en banc.135 On December 16, 2014, three of the five judges on the en banc
panel voted to reverse the district court’s order.136 The two judges in the
majority of the three-judge panel dissented from the en banc majority
opinion.137 The en banc majority examined de novo whether the treatment the
MDOC offered Kosilek was constitutionally adequate, and determined that it
was.138
Although the district court’s opinion has no precedential authority, its
reasoning may still be instructive for future transgender litigants. The court’s
analysis shows signs that it was influenced by concerns about prejudice
against transgender people. Importantly, the First Circuit agreed with the
district court that political pressure and prejudice are not valid penological
reasons for denying necessary medical treatment.139 Rather, the First Circuit
129

Associated Press, Trans Inmate Asks US Supreme Court to Allow Sex-Reassignment
Surgery, GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2015, 17:18 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2015/mar/16/prison-inmate-supreme-court-ruling-sex-resassignment-surgery, archived at
http://perma.cc/5N6S-HTLR.
130
Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 247.
131
Id.
132
Kosilek v. Spencer, 740 F.3d 733, 736 (1st Cir. 2014), withdrawn Feb. 12, 2014.
133
Id. at 772–73.
134
Id.
135
Kosilek v. Spencer, No. 12-2194, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2660, at *3 (1st Cir. Feb. 12,
2014).
136
Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 2014).
137
Id. at 96 (Thompson, J., dissenting); id. at 113 (Kayatta, J., dissenting).
138
Id. at 86, 89.
139
Id. at 94–96.
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held that the district court should have given more deference to the MDOC’s
medical and security experts in assessing whether the MDOC’s motives were
improper.140 A careful reading of the district court’s analysis may still be
useful to future transgender litigants in determining under what set of facts a
judge may be convinced of prison officials’ deliberate indifference.
The district court’s decision in Kosilek II was predicated on its decision
in Kosilek v. Maloney (Kosilek I) ten years earlier.141 In that case, Kosilek
sought an injunction to require the MDOC to provide her with hormone
therapy.142 The court denied the injunction.143 Although it found that she had
a serious medical need, GID, for which she had not been adequately treated,
the court held that the MDOC Commissioner had not been deliberately
indifferent to her needs because he did not have actual knowledge of her
suffering.144 Going forward, the court said that security concerns might
justify denial of hormone therapy if there was no possible way to reconcile
the Commissioner’s duty to protect inmates’ safety with his duty to provide
adequate medical care.145 The court ruled that if the Commissioner were to
decide in the future that safety concerns outweigh Kosilek’s medical need,
then a court would have to determine whether the Eighth Amendment was
violated.146 The court warned, however, that if the MDOC Commissioner
were to base his decision on concerns about cost or political controversy, he
would violate the Eighth Amendment.147
In light of its decision in Kosilek I, the district court in Kosilek II
analyzed the MDOC’s stated security justification for denying Kosilek sexreassignment surgery. The court found that Kosilek had a serious medical
need for which the only adequate treatment was sex-reassignment surgery.148
The court determined that, unlike in Kosilek I, the current MDOC
Commissioner was deliberately indifferent to Kosilek’s serious medical need
because she had actual knowledge of Kosilek’s suffering and her stated

140

Id. at 86–89 (disagreeing with the district court’s finding that the MDOC’s medical
expert was imprudent because of his belief that sex-reassignment surgery was not medically
necessary); id. at 91–92 (holding that the MDOC’s reliance on medical experts was reasonable
and negates a finding of deliberate indifference); id. at 93–94 (holding that the district court
should have given more deference to the MDOC’s security experts).
141
Kosilek v. Maloney (Kosilek I), 221 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Mass. 2002).
142
Id. at 159.
143
Id. at 195.
144
Id. at 161–62.
145
Id. at 162.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II), 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 22930 (D. Mass. 2012).
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security concern was pretextual.149 The court found that the real motive for
prohibiting the surgery was the Commissioner’s concerns about public and
political criticisma rationale which the court in Kosilek I said violates the
Eighth Amendment.150
Although Kosilek did not raise an equal protection claim in her
complaint,151 and the district court did not mention the Fourteenth
Amendment in its opinion, the district court’s Eighth Amendment analysis
was seemingly influenced by two equal protection principles. First, the court
invoked the equal protection principle of similarly situated individuals,
stressing that Kosilek was treated differently from similarly situated
prisoners with more familiar medical needs because of the unpopular nature
of her medical need. Second, in analyzing whether the prison officials’ stated
security justification was made in bad faith, the court applied a similar pretext
analysis to that applied in equal protection cases in which the courts use
“rational basis with bite” review.152 The court in Kosilek II did not
clandestinely engage in equal protection analysis as the Seventh Circuit did
in Fields,153 but it introduced concepts that are not usually part of Eighth
Amendment analysis.
The first influence of equal protection in the court’s analysis is its
references to similarly situated prisoners, a principle not typically present in
Eighth Amendment analysis. For example, the district court cited to a portion
of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Fields that compared prisoners seeking
hormone therapy to prisoners in need of cancer treatment: “[s]urely, had the
[] legislature passed a law that DOC inmates with cancer must be treated only
with therapy and pain killers, this court would have no trouble concluding
that the law was unconstitutional.”154 By including this quotation, the court
demonstrated that Kosilek was treated differently than similarly situated
prisoners with a more familiar medical need, and that the differential
treatment was because of the unconventional nature of that need.
The court also suggested that the treatment of Kosilek was cruel and
unusual because it was discriminatory, stating that “[i]t is unusual to treat a
prisoner suffering severely from a gender identity disorder differently than
the numerous inmates suffering from more familiar forms of mental
149

Id. at 23740.
Id. at 240.
151
Second Amended Complaint at 13–14, Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D.
Mass. 2012) (No. 00-12455-MLW).
152
See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text.
153
See supra Part III.A.
154
Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 208 (quoting Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 556 (7th Cir.
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
150
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illness.”155 This quote suggests that the court, in determining that the prison
officials acted with deliberate indifference, was persuaded, at least in part, by
the fact that the officials were discriminating against her because of Kosilek’s
GID.
Finally, the court compared Kosilek to non-transgender similarly
situated prisoners, stating that “Kosilek shares with every other inmate in the
DOC’s custody the right to have decisions concerning [her]156 made by prison
officials reasonably and in good faith in order to assure that [she] is not again
subject to the cruel and unusual punishment that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits.”157 This statement suggests that prison officials did not simply
violate Kosilek’s right to be free from cruel and unusual treatment; by
violating her Eighth Amendment right because of her transgender status, they
may have also violated her right to equal protection, as well.
The second apparent influence of equal protection principles on the
district court’s decision in Kosilek II appears in its analysis of whether the
MDOC had a legitimate penological reason to deny Kosilek’s treatment.
Without explicitly invoking “rational basis with bite,”158 the district court
used similar language in drawing the line for legitimate penological interests
under the Eighth Amendment. The “rational basis with bite” test comes from
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, in which the Supreme
Court held “that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”159 The district court’s
analysis in Kosilek II mirrors the language in the “rational basis with bite”
test. In Kosilek II, the court held that concerns about political or public
criticism surrounding Kosilek’s status as both a convicted murderer and a
transgender woman cannot constitute a legitimate penological interest under
the Eighth Amendment.160
Commissioner Dennehy claimed that Kosilek’s request for surgery was
denied because of the risk it posed to prison security.161 Although the court
held that prison security is a valid penological interest, it concluded that

155

Id. at 205.
The district court used a male pronoun to refer to Kosilek. Id. at 198.
157
Id. at 205.
158
See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text (discussing “rational basis with bite”).
159
U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (emphasis omitted).
160
Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 201 (“[S]ecurity is a legitimate consideration for Eighth
Amendment purposes. A concern about political or public criticism for discharging a
constitutional duty is not.” (quoting Kosilek v. Maloney (Kosilek I), 221 F. Supp. 156, 162 (D.
Mass. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
161
Id. at 240.
156
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Dennehy’s security concerns were pretextual162 and that her decision was
instead based on a desire to avoid public and political criticism, which is not
a permissible penological interest.163 The court first grounded its reasoning
in the Eighth Amendment:
Denying adequate medical care because of a fear of controversy or criticism from
politicians, the press, and the public serves no legitimate penological purpose. It is
precisely the type of conduct the Eighth Amendment prohibits . . . . “[T]he very purpose
of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.”164 Therefore, “[t]he right to be
free of cruel and unusual punishments, like other guarantees of the Bill of Rights, may
not be submitted to vote; it depends on the outcome of no elections.”165

The court then went on to imply that the only reason Kosilek’s request
for surgery invited public criticism was that she was a convicted murderer:
Prisoners who have lost their liberty by murdering others may understandably be
unsympathetic candidates for the humane treatment that they denied their victims.
However, as future Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in 1979: “[T]he
whole point of the [Eighth] [A]mendment is to protect persons convicted of crimes.
Eighth [A]mendment protections are not forfeited by one’s prior acts.” It is despised
criminals, like Kosilek, who are most likely to need the protection of the Eighth
Amendment and its enforcement by the courts. 166

The court also cited a Boston Globe article that refers to Kosilek as a
“certified wife killer,”167 and another that states, “[t]he [Kosilek] trial
162

Id. at 23940. The court made detailed findings of fact supporting this conclusion. The
court found that Commissioner Dennehy “was determined not to be the first prison official to
provide an inmate [with] sex reassignment surgery.” Id. at 201. Dennehy fired the prison
doctor who had prescribed surgery and hired a doctor who she knew was opposed to
prescribing the surgery to prisoners under any circumstance. Id. at 20102. The court found
that Dennehy departed from the department’s established, written procedure for determining
security risks, and she testified falsely about the risk. Id. at 24041. The court detailed the
specific pressure that Dennehy faced in the Kosilek case from both politicians and the media.
Dennehy served under a lieutenant governor who openly opposed spending tax revenues on
Kosilek’s surgery. Id. at 203. Many members of the state legislature, including one
representative who had a close relationship with Dennehy, opposed the same. Id. She
coordinated a television appearance with that legislator to voice her opposition to the surgery.
Id. at 223. The court also cited several Boston Globe articles, of which Dennehy was aware,
ridiculing the idea that the state should spend money on a prisoner’s sex-reassignment surgery.
Id. at 225. The court concluded from this evidence that Dennehy’s actual reason for denying
Kosilek access to the surgery was because of fear of criticism and controversy. Id. at 198.
163
Id. at 247.
164
Id. at 203 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
165
Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 268 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
166
Id. at 20304 (quoting Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 194 (9th Cir. 1979)).
167
Id. at 214 (citing Brian McGrory, A Test Case for Change, BOSTON GLOBE, June 13,
2000, at B1).
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underway in federal court in Boston is not about the rights of transsexuals.
It’s about the manipulations of a murderer.”168
If the court had stopped there, it might be said that the court was
concerned only with the political and public criticism surrounding Kosilek
based on her status as a “despised criminal” and “certified wife killer.”
However, a few paragraphs after the last excerpt, the court confirmed that it
was concerned not only with discrimination based on her status as a
murderer, but also on her status as a transgender woman. The court stated:
It has long been well-established that it is cruel for prison officials to permit an inmate
to suffer unnecessarily from a serious medical need. It is unusual to treat a prisoner
suffering severely from a gender identity disorder differently than the numerous inmates
suffering from more familiar forms of mental illness. It is not permissible for prison
officials to do so just because the fact that a gender identity disorder is a major mental
illness is not understood by much of the public and the required treatment for it is
unpopular.169

Moreover, the court concluded that “the defendant has denied Kosilek
sex reassignment surgery because of the belief that the idea of providing such
treatment for a transsexual who murdered his wife is offensive to many
members of the community, many of their elected representatives, and to the
actively interested media as well.”170 Therefore, Kosilek’s right to equal
protection of her Eighth Amendment right seems to be driving the court’s
holding.
The district court did not expressly rule on whether the MDOC’s
decision to deny Kosilek’s request for sex-reassignment surgery violated the
Equal Protection Clause, and it is not obvious from the opinion that the court
would have found a violation. It is clear, however, that the court’s reasoning
under the Eighth Amendment was influenced by its concerns about
discrimination against transgender prisoners, as evidenced by its references
to similarly situated prisoners and its concerns about political and public
criticism based on Kosilek’s status as a transgender woman.
On appeal, the en banc majority of the First Circuit agreed with the
district court that “public and political criticism” could be grounds for a
finding of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment where the
plaintiff is also able to show that the prison officials’ security concerns were
completely pretextual.171 The First Circuit disagreed, however, with the
district court’s findings that the MDOC was motivated only by public and
168

Id. at 225 (citing Eileen McNamara, When Gender Isn’t Relevant, BOSTON GLOBE, June
11, 2006, at B1).
169
Id. at 205.
170
Id. at 247.
171
See Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 94–96 (1st Cir. 2014).
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political criticism and that the MDOC’s safety and security concerns were
pretextual.172 The First Circuit held that the district court should have given
more deference to the prison officials on safety and security.173 Moreover,
the First Circuit held that even if Commissioner Dennehy were motivated by
public and political criticism, her motivations were not enough to show that
the MDOC continued to be motivated by public and political criticism after
she left the position.174
Unlike the district court’s opinion, the First Circuit’s opinion shows no
apparent signs of equal protection influence or concerns about prejudice
against transgender people. However, in her dissent, Judge Thompson
directly addresses the issue of unfair prejudice against transgender people
that the district court only hinted about. Comparing the majority’s opinion to
two of the most notorious equal protection cases in United States history,
Judge Thompson speculates that the majority’s decision will not stand the
test of time:
I am confident that I would not need to pen this dissent, over twenty years after
Kosilek’s quest for constitutionally adequate medical care began, were she not seeking
a treatment that many see as strange or immoral. Prejudice and fear of the unfamiliar
have undoubtedly played a role in this matter’s protraction. Whether today’s decision
brings this case to a close, I cannot say. But I am confident that this decision will not
stand the test of time, ultimately being shelved with the likes of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), deeming constitutional state laws requiring racial segregation, and
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), finding constitutional the internment
of Japanese–Americans in camps during World War II. I only hope that day is not far
in the future, for the precedent the majority creates is damaging. It paves the way for
unprincipled grants of en banc relief, decimates the deference paid to a trial judge
following a bench trial, aggrieves an already marginalized community, and enables
correctional systems to further postpone their adjustment to the crumbling gender
binary. 175

The First Circuit’s opinion leaves open the question of what set of facts
would be sufficient to establish deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s need
for sex-reassignment surgery. The district court’s opinion in Kosilek II and
Judge Thompson’s dissent to the First Circuit opinion suggest that some
federal judges will be receptive to an argument framed in terms of
discrimination and equal protection principles.

172
173
174
175

Id. at 92–96.
Id. at 93–94.
Id. at 95–96.
Id. at 113 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
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C. FIELDS AND KOSILEK II COMPARED AND IN THE BROADER
CONTEXT

As in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Fields, the district court’s Eighth
Amendment analysis in Kosilek II shows the influence of equal protection
principles, albeit more subtly. In Fields, the Seventh Circuit essentially
affirmed the district court’s reasoning for finding an equal protection
violation, without expressly addressing the claim. In Kosilek II, the court did
not reason through all of the elements of an equal protection claim, but rather
applied equal protection concepts like similarly situated individuals, pretext,
and animus to the Eighth Amendment analysis.176
There are two obvious differences between Fields and the district
court’s opinion in Kosilek II that account for the varying levels of equal
protection influence. First, in Fields, the district court had previously held
that the Wisconsin law violated the Eighth Amendment and the Equal
Protection Clause.177 The Seventh Circuit, in affirming the district court’s
Eighth Amendment holding, also affirmed much of the reasoning that
supported the equal protection holding below. Unlike Fields, there was no
earlier decision based on equal protection grounds in Kosilek II. The plaintiff
in that case did not even raise an equal protection argument in the
pleadings.178
The second difference is that Fields dealt with a state law banning
hormone therapy and sex-reassignment surgery for all prisoners. Such a
broad state-wide law is more susceptible to an equal protection challenge
because it openly classifies a group of people for different treatment. In
Kosilek II, the decision to deny the surgery to Kosilek was individualized.
One may, however, infer that the district court thought this individualized
decision was part of a broader unwritten policy from the court’s finding that
Commissioner Dennehy was “determined not to be the first prison official to
provide an inmate sex reassignment surgery.”179 Furthermore, the court was
surely aware of two other recent lawsuits against the MDOC in the

176 Prison health care is not the only area of transgender rights doctrine with examples of
clandestine equal protection analysis. Professor Gabriel Arkles noted in his article on the
segregation of transgender prisoners in solitary confinement that the district court in the
unreported case Tates v. Blanas, “[w]ithout explicitly naming it as such, [] engaged in an Equal
Protection analysis comparing the treatment of transgender detainees with the treatment of
similarly situated non-transgender detainees.” Arkles, supra note 79, at 554 (citing Tates v.
Blanas, No. S-00-2539 OMP, 2003 WL 23864868, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2003)).
177 Fields v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 862–63, 869 (E.D. Wis. 2010).
178 Second Amended Complaint at 13–14, Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D.
Mass. 2012) (No. 00-12455-MLW).
179
Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 201.
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Massachusetts district court filed by transgender prisoners who were denied
access to hormone therapy180 and sex-reassignment surgery.181
Fields and Kosilek II are not the only cases addressing the issue of
whether prisoners are entitled to hormone therapy and sex-reassignment
surgery. At least four other courts have recently granted injunctions or
motions to compel in favor of the prisoners, requiring prison officials to
administer hormones or allow the prisoner to be evaluated for sexreassignment surgery.182 Many more have allowed prisoners to proceed on
their Eighth Amendment claims by denying the prison officials’ dispositive
motions.183
180

Battista v. Dennehy, No. 05-11456-DPW, 2006 WL 1581528 (D. Mass. Mar. 22, 2006)
(seeking hormone therapy), aff’d, Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 455 (1st Cir. 2011).
181
Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 252 (D. Mass. 2012) (seeking screening for
sex-reassignment surgery).
182
See Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 455 (1st Cir. 2011) (affirming district court’s
decision to grant an injunction requiring prison officials to administer hormone therapy
because the district court reasonably concluded that prison officials were deliberately
indifferent); De’lonta v. Clarke, No. 7:11-cv-00257, 2013 WL 4584684 (W.D. Va. Aug. 28,
2013) (granting plaintiff’s motion to compel prison officials to make her available to be
evaluated for readiness for sex-reassignment surgery by her own expert, at her own expense);
Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 252–53 (D. Mass. 2012) (holding that prison
officials were deliberately indifferent, that the blanket ban on sex-reassignment surgery
violates the Eighth Amendment, and ordering officials to provide medical evaluations and
treatment based on an individualized assessment of plaintiff’s needs, including readiness for
sex-reassignment surgery); Brugliera v. Comm’r of Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 07-40323-JLT,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131002 at 36 (D. Mass. Dec. 16, 2009) (granting plaintiff’s Second
Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction requiring prison officials to provide plaintiff with
hormone therapy).
183
See, e.g., De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 522, 525 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that
plaintiff has pled facts sufficient to state a claim under Eighth Amendment where prison
officials have continued to deny consideration of sex-reassignment surgery); De’lonta v.
Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 63132 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff has pled facts sufficient
to state a claim under Eighth Amendment where prison officials abruptly cut off hormone
therapy); Allard v. Gomez, 9 Fed. App’x 793, 795 (9th Cir. 2001) (reversing district court’s
grant of summary judgment for defendant because triable issues of fact exist as to whether
hormone therapy was denied on the basis of an individualized medical evaluation or on the
basis of blanket rule, which would constitute deliberate indifference); Franklin v. Hardy, No.
12 C 2970, 2013 WL 3147365 at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 2013) (holding that plaintiff has
stated a plausible claim under the Eighth Amendment for failure to treat her GID); Konitzer
v. Wall, No. 12-cv-874-bbc, 2013 WL 2297059 at *1 (W.D. Wis. May 24, 2013) (same);
Alexander v. Weiner, 841 F. Supp. 2d 486, 492 (D. Mass. 2012) (same); Adams v. Fed. Bur.
of Prisons, 716 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112–13 (D. Mass. 2010) (denying defendants’ motion to
dismiss because even though prison officials have ceased denial of treatment, they have not
proven that such denial is unlikely to recur); Barrett v. Coplan, 292 F. Supp. 2d 281, 286
(D.N.H. 2003) (holding plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to show prison officials were
deliberately indifferent to her serious medical need because they refused to evaluate her for
GID); Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 312 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that defendants
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Although the district court’s opinion in Kosilek II was eventually
reversed and Fields alone does not establish a pattern of equal protection
influence, they are still important opinions because they show how federal
judges are thinking about the issue of transgender prisoner health care. Fields
and Kosilek II are among only a few cases that have gone to trial, in which
the district courts made lengthy findings of fact on the true motivations
behind the prison officials’ decisions.184 Although the First Circuit ultimately
held that more facts were needed to support the district court’s finding of
deliberate indifference in Kosilek II, reading the district court’s opinion in
conjunction with the First Circuit’s opinion is instructive for future
transgender litigants seeking to build a case of deliberate indifference.
Moreover, Fields and Kosilek II are two of the most written-about cases in
legal literature discussing what level of health care is constitutionally
required for transgender prisoners.185
have failed to show they were not deliberately indifferent as a matter of law because blanket
policy providing no treatment for prisoners diagnosed with GID only after being incarcerated
violates Eighth Amendment), vacated, 289 F. Supp. 2d 286 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that the
previous order was properly decided, but defendants made admissions of material fact in their
Motion to Reconsider that necessitated vacation).
184
Fields was decided after a one-day bench trial on March 31, 2010. Fields v. Smith, 712
F. Supp. 2d 830, 834 (E.D. Wis. 2010). Kosilek II was decided after a twenty-eight-day bench
trial in the spring of 2006. Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 212, 225 (D. Mass. 2012).
The two other cases decided following bench trials were Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d at 451,
and Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 230.
185
See generally David W. Austin, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 47 INT’L LAW.
469 (2013) (discussing developments in gender identity law in 2012 including Kosilek II);
Rena Lindevaldson, A State’s Obligation to Fund Hormonal Therapy and Sex-Reassignment
Surgery for Prisoners Diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder, 7 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 15
(2012) (discussing Fields and Kosilek II in arguing that the Eighth Amendment does not
require a state to pay for hormone therapy or sex-reassignment surgery); Givens, supra note
67 (arguing that the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Fields provides the clearest and most
reasonable assessment of why GID should constitute a serious medical need under the Eighth
Amendment); Lila Leonard, Note, Gender Reassignment Surgery in Prisons: How the Eighth
Amendment Guarantees Medical Treatments Not Covered by Private Insurance or Medicare
for Law-Abiding Citizens, 11 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 626 (2014) (criticizing the decision
in Kosilek II because it requires a higher level of care for prisoners than is typically covered
by Medicare and private health insurance plans for law-abiding citizens); Silpa Maruri, Note,
Hormone Therapy for Inmates: A Metonym for Transgender Rights, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 807 (2011) (discussing Fields and Kosilek I in arguing for a new legal strategy for
transgender prisoners based on quasi-fundamental rights established in Plyler v. Doe); Ethan
Z. Tieger, Note, Transsexual Prisoners and the Eighth Amendment: A Reconsideration of
Kosilek v. Spencer and Why Prison Officials May Not Be Constitutionally Required to Provide
Sex-Reassignment Surgery, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 627 (2014) (arguing that the Court’s
opinion in Kosilek II failed to consider security concerns after the sex-reassignment surgery
and ignored the distinction between “curative” and “adequate” care for gender dysphoria or
GID).
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IV. GOING FORWARD: FRAMING A NARRATIVE OF DISCRIMINATION UNDER
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The opinions in Fields and Kosilek II present transgender legal
advocates with an opportunity to develop a doctrine based on discrimination
within the Eighth Amendment. As demonstrated in those two cases,
discrimination may be relevant to the subjective prong of Eighth Amendment
analysis: refusing medically necessary treatment based on political animus
towards transgender people is not a legitimate penological interest, and thus
constitutes deliberate indifference. For transgender prisoners seeking genderconfirming health care, an Eighth Amendment doctrine based on
discrimination may be the best way to fight discrimination and win cases.
The path forward does not require a change in legal claims, but rather a
change in factual advocacy. Using concepts of similarly situated individuals,
pretext, and political and public controversy, legal advocates should start
framing plaintiffs’ factual summaries around stories of discrimination. This
concept, known as “story framing,” is one of the most important advocacy
tools a lawyer has to sway a fact-finder.186
In particular, legal advocates should pay close attention to the facts the
courts found persuasive in Fields and Kosilek II. Both courts focused on the
fact that prisoners with GID were treated differently than other prisoners with
more socially accepted medical needs (like cancer).187 Furthermore, both
courts relied on facts showing that denial of treatment was not related to any
prison security benefits. In particular, the courts focused on concessions by
the state’s security expert that denying hormone therapy does not decrease
the risk of sexual assault188 and the fact that prison officials departed from
the department’s established, written procedure for determining security
risks.189 In Kosilek II, the court also focused on facts that showed that the
MDOC Commissioner’s actual reason for denying the surgery was a fear of
186
Steven Lubet, Story Framing, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 59, 61 (2001) (“The story frame may
well be the trial lawyer’s most powerful rhetorical tool, because of its extraordinary
effectiveness in the battle for the fact-finder’s imagination.”).
187
Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 554 (7th Cir. 2011) (relying on medical testimony that
“no other state law or policy, besides Act 105 . . . prohibits prison doctors from providing
inmates with medically necessary treatment”); Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 199 (“[s]urely,
had the [] legislature passed a law that DOC inmates with cancer must be treated only with
therapy and pain killers, this court would have no trouble concluding that the law was
unconstitutional”) (quoting Fields, 653 F.3d at 556).
188
Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 868 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (relying on the state’s
security expert’s concession that it would be an “incredible stretch” to say that prohibiting
hormone therapy would prevent sexual assaults in prison) (internal citations omitted).
189
Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 240–41 (finding that prison officials departed from the
department’s “established, written procedure” for determining security risks).
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criticism and controversy.190 Legal advocates should look for the existence
of similar facts to highlight in their complaints.
As litigants frame their factual allegations around stories of
discrimination, more courts will discuss discrimination in their opinions, and
a set of persuasive case law will develop upon which future courts and
litigants can rely as authority. The ultimate goal in developing this new
Eighth Amendment doctrine would be to force prisons to change their
policies on providing gender-confirming health care while also addressing
the underlying discrimination against transgender people in prisons. If
discrimination against transgender prisoners constitutes deliberate
indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prisons will have no
choice but to start providing gender-confirming health care to those prisoners
who need it.
CONCLUSION
Obtaining access to gender-confirming health care is a serious problem
for many transgender prisoners. In bringing these suits, transgender litigants
need a litigation strategy that is effective not only in obtaining the health care
they seek, but also in addressing the underlying discrimination behind prison
policies restricting gender-confirming health care.
The usual strategy for fighting discrimination, the Equal Protection
Clause, is a losing strategy for transgender litigants as long as the Supreme
Court remains unwilling to extend heightened scrutiny to new classes of
people. Transgender prisoners have had more success litigating under the
Eighth Amendment. Although the Eighth Amendment was not designed to
address discrimination, the courts in Fields and Kosilek II used the Eighth
Amendment’s deliberate indifference prong to reject the prison policies
because of their discriminatory nature. If transgender litigants can build off
of these cases to create an antidiscrimination doctrine within the Eighth
Amendment, they may be able to achieve the goal of obtaining the health care
they need while fighting discrimination.

190

See supra note 162 (discussing the evidence relied on by the court in Kosilek II to
conclude that Dennehy’s stated security justification was pretextual, and that the actual reason
she denied Kosilek’s request was a fear of public and political controversy).
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